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This article examines the intergenerational transmission of political party pref-
erence by analyzing data from a national representative survey of high school
students in the Netherlands in 1991 (N = 5,148). Multinominallogistic diagonal
reference models are applied to analyze the data. In general, no difference is
found between the relative influence of father's and mother's polilical party pref-
erence. However, father's party preference has more of an effect on son's party
preference than mother's, while mother's party preference has more impact on
daughter's party preference than father's. Finally, contrary to our hypothesis. the
chance of children With politically heterogeneous parents having a political party
preference is no less than that of children of politically homogeneous parents.
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ardson, and Watanuki, 1991; Wittebrood, 1993a). Without exception,
these studies revealed high similarity between parents' and children's po-
litical party preferences, indicating a strong intergenerational transmission
of political party preference.
However, the extent of similarity differs between children whose parents
prefer the same political party (politically homogeneous parents) and
children whose parents prefer different political parties (politically het-
erogeneous parents) (Jennings and Niemi, 1974; Niemi, Newman, and
Weimer, 1982). Where both parents prefer the same political party, their
child is influenced in the same direction. Consequently, it can be assumed
that this child will adopt its parents' political preference. A child with
politically heterogeneous parents is torn between father's and mother's
political party preferences. The child is exposed to opposite influences
which create uncertainty and ambiguity regarding an appropriate political
response. The extent of similarity between the political party preference
of the child with that of the parents can be expected to be less than that
of a child with politically homogeneous parents.
The central question addressed in this article concerns the influence of
fathers and mothers on the political party preference of their children in
the Netherlands. The existing political socialization literature pays very
little attention to the intergenerational transmission of political party pref-
erence in the Netherlands. Questions regarding this topic have been posed
only incidentally in Dutch youth and electoral research (Hagendoom and
Janssen, 1983; Janssen and Voestermans, 1984; De Hart, 1990).
According to Jennings, AJlerbeck, and Rosenmayr (1979); Jennings
(1984); and Westholm and Niemi (1992), political socialization processes
in the Netherlands differ from those in other countries. This is reflected
in the lowest parent-offspring similarity of partisanship of all countries
where research on this subject has been carried out. Parent-offspring
similarity is somewhat lower than in West Germany, Italy, United States,
and Switzerland and much lower than in Austria, United Kingdom, Fin-
land, and Sweden. Two explanations are offered. First, in countries with
a multiparty political system such as the Netherlands, intergenerational
transmission of political party preference is less powerful than in two-
party political systems (Percheron and Jennings, 1981). Second, as Tho-
massen (1976) showed, individual political party preference in The Neth-
erlands is not based on a stable party identification, causing a lower rate
of transmission than in countries where party identification plays a major
role (Westholm and Niemi, 1992).
In order to investigate intergenerational transmission of political party
preference in the Netherlands, we formulated explicit hypotheses based
on earlier political socialization studies done mostly in other countries.
We tested our hypotheses by analyzing data from a survey held among
high school pupils in the Netherlands in 1991.
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HYPOTHESES
It is assumed that both the father and the mother influence their child's
political party preference. If the parents prefer the same political party,
the child is doubly influenced in the same direction. In this situation,
knowing which parent is the more influential is of little relevance. A child
with politically heterogeneous parents is exposed to counteractive influ-
ences. In order to explain political party preference of such child, it is
important to find out whether there is a difference between the effect of
the father's and the mother's political preference. In this article, we state
a number of hypotheses on the relative influence of parents' political party
preference on that of their child. As a baseline we formulate the equal-
parental socialization hypothesis: Mother's and father's politicalparty pref-
erences are equally influential on a child's political party preference.
The first studies done on voting behavior assumed that the father's
political role was dominant in political socialization processes (see for
example Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1948). The father was assumed
to be the more dominant socialization agent in the intergenerational trans-
mission of political party preference. However, empirical research in var-
ious western countries has never corroborated this idea. Many studies
found the mother to be the more dominant socialization agent (Jennings
and Niemi, 1971, 1974). A possible explanation for this is that, in general,
mothers spend more time with their children in their formative years than
fathers. As a result, children develop closer affective ties with their mother
than with their father (Asher, 1980; Himmelweit et aI., 1981). We pos-
tulate the mother-dominated socialization hypothesis: The mother's po-
litical party preference influences a child's political party preference more
than the father's.
A related question is whether the impact of the political party preference
of fathers and mothers is equal for sons and daughters. Since children
identify more with the same-sex parent, earlier studies expected sons to
be relatively more influenced by their fathers and daughters by their
mothers (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974). Most political socialization studies
on gender-specific socialization confirm this idea (Jennings and Niemi,
1974; Niemi, Ross, and Alexander, 1978; De Hart, 1990). We therefore
refined our mother-dominated socialization hypothesis to include the as-
sumption that the influence of father's and mother's political party pref-
erence depends on the sex of their child. The result is two gender-specific
socialization hypotheses: (a) The mother's political pony preference influ-
ences a daughter's political party preference more than the father's, and
(b) The father's political party preference influences a son's political party
preference more than the mother's.
These hypotheses concern the effects of the father's and mother's po-
litical party preference on that of their child. It is assumed that, regardless
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of the effects of the father's and mother's political party preference, the
exposure of a child with politically heterogeneous parents to cross-pres-
sures has an effect in itself. In their well-known study, Lazarsfeld et ai.
(1948) showed that voters exposed to cross-pressures have less chance of
having a political preference than voters not exposed to cross-pressures.
A child influenced by the parents in different political directions will
therefore to be less apt to have a political party preference. Cross-pres-
sures create uncertainty and ambiguity as to an appropriate political re-
sponse. The child will react to this uncertainty by not having a political
party preference at all, thus avoiding political conflict with the parents.
This leads to the following heterogeneity hypothesis: A child with polit-
ically heterogeneous parents is less apt to prefer a political party than a
child with politically homogeneous parents.
Referring to the study of Lazersfeld et al. (1948), Sperlich argued that
it is not just the cross-pressure situation per se, but the magnitude of
cross-pressure that is relevant in explaining political behavior (1971, p.
28). This implies that the more the parents differ in political party pref-
erence, the less chance there is that their child will have a political party
preference. Therefore, a magnitude of heterogeneity hypothesis can be
formulated: The more heterogeneous the political party preference of par-
ents, the less apt their child is to have a political party preference.
DATA
The hypotheses were tested with data from a study on the acquisition
and development of political involvement of adolescents in The Nether-
lands. Data were collected from 10,248 pupils at 71 randomly selected
high schools (in senior general secondary education (havo) and pre-uni-
versity education (vwo)) in 1991. Pupils in the 15-17 age group filled in
a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Thirty-seven percent provided no in-
formation on their parents' political party preferences.' In addition, 9%
of the pupils did not answer questions on relevant characteristics used for
control, such as gender, social class, and religion. As a result, analysis
was restricted to 5148 pupils. The final selection of pupils was not based
on the dependent variable, the children's political party preference. It is
therefore unlikely that this restricted selection influences the results of
the study.'
I This finding is confinned by other surveys among adolescents in the Netherlands. In a
study done by Social and Cultural Planning office (SCP, 1994), for example. it is found that
about 40% of children are not acquainted with the party preference of their parents.
~ In a separate analysis we examined the nature of a possible bias in the selection of the
children (Wittebrood, 1993b). The most relevant bias was an overrepresentation of children
who were interested in politics. However. an additional analysis in which children who had
indicated that they were not interested in politics were deleted (and thus the systematic
bias was enlarged) lead to similar conclusions as the analysis discussed in this article.
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The main variables in our analysis are the political party preference of
children and the political party preference of their parents. Children were
asked which party they would vote for if there were general elections
today and which party their parents would vote for. The six political
parties in the questionnaire were the left-wing political parties, GL (Green
Left), D66 (Demdcrats '66) and PvdA (Labor Party); the secular right-
wing party, VVD (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy); and the
denominational political parties, CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal) and
SR (small right: a combination of three small protestant parties, GPV
[Reformed Political Union), RPF [Reformed Political Federation), and
SGP [Political Reformed Party]). There was also the option "no pref-
erence." This answer was used as our reference category, political pref-
erence being a nominal variable in our analysis:
The survey data do not contain information on the actual parental
political preference, only on the parents' political preference as perceived
by their children. According to Niemi (1974), this might lead to a small
overestimation of the similarity between the parents' political party pref-
erence and that of their children.3 It also might lead to a small overes-
timation of the number of homogeneous parents in our data (Acock and
Bengtson, 1980; Niemi, 1973, 1974). However, these shortcomings are
believed to have no serious consequences for the conclusions presented
in this article for two reasons. First, most hypotheses deal with relative
influence of political party preference instead of absolute influence. Sec-
ond, shortcomings in the data make the test of the heterogeneity hy-
potheses even stronger. It can be assumed that those children who perceive
their parents to be politically heterogeneous will be more likely to ex-
perience cross-pressures and consequently will be more apt to prefer no
political party at all, than children who do not realize that their parents
are politically heterogeneous. Therefore, when we do not find an effect
of heterogeneous parents it is extra unlikely that such effects occurred.
Rejection of the hypotheses due to shortcomings in the data should be
taken as a profound indication that these hypotheses do not hold.
To test the gender-specific socialization hypothesis, we include two
additional variables in Our models: girl, coded as (0) for boys and (1) for
. girls; and boy, coded as (0) for girls and (1) for boys.
To test our two heterogeneity hypotheses which state that there is an
independent effect of politically heterogeneous parents on the political
party preference of their children, we created two variables. The first
variable is a dummy variable, heterogeneity, coded (0) for children who
3 Bengtson and Kuypers (1971) suggested a "development stake" hypothesis that states
that children characteristically overestimate the amount of disagreement in opinions and
values with their parents. In empirical analysis, however. this hypothesis has not been
corroborated (Niemi, 1974).
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have politically homogeneous parents and coded (I) for children who have
politically heterogeneous parents. The second variable is the magnitude
of heterogeneity. To construct this variable, many possible procedures
could be used. We used one which first gives a score on a left-right scale
to each political party based on the mean left-right placement of all
children who preferred that party. These scores are Green Left (3.4),
PvdA (4.4), D66 (4.8), CDA (5.8), VVD (6.8), and small right (7.3).
Subsequently, the difference between the father's and mother's political
party preference is calculated for each child. Children with politically
homogeneous parents, consequently, score zero on this variable.4
Finally, we include variables referring to the child's socioeconomic class
and religious denomination. Investigating the effects of direct political
socialization, it is good practice to take into account indirect socialization
through the child's reference groups (Flanagan, 1991, p. ISO). Socioec-
onomic class is based on the highest class position of one of the parents.
Three classes are distinguished, white-collar working class, blue-collar
working class, and farmers. With regard to religion, two categories are
distinguished, non-religiOUS and religious. Because the influence of socio-
economic class differs in the Netherlands between religious and non~
religious people (Lijphart, 1975; Andeweg, 1982), dummy variables were
included in our models for each of the class-religion combinations. Non-
religious blue-collar workers are taken as the reference category.
POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE OF FATHERS, MOTHERS, AND
THEIR CHILDREN
Table 1 shows the political party preference of fathers, mothers, and
their children. As might be expected in the Dutch situation in 1991, the
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) has the highest percentage of ad-
herents among children and parents, while the left-Wing Green Left (GL)
party and the denominational parties combined in small right (SR) have
the lowest percentage. Furthermore, as the figures in Table 1 indicate,
an average of 4% of the children show no political party preference.
Table 1 also shows the distribution of political party preferences of the
various reference groups. There is a strong relation between religion and
political preference. Of all non-religious children, only 15% stated a pref-
erence for one of the denominational political parties (CDA and small
right), whereas 61% of the religious children preferred a denominational
4 To apply an interval variable as measure for the magnitude of heterogeneity seems
contradictory to our recommendation of treating voting behavior as a nominal Variable.
Alternative strategies, such as using several dummy variables that represent distances be-
tween partiCUlar political party preferences of fathers and mothers, however, complicated
our models substantially. Furthermore, such models did not yield different conclusions. For
these reasons, we present only the results of the analysis using the interval variable as
measure for the magnitude of heterogeneity.
TABLE 1
Political Party Preference of Fathers, Mothers, and Children in the Netherlands in 1991 (Percentages; N between Brackets)
Political party preference
'"0
Green Small No aPvdA CDA VVD D66 left right preference Total ~
Fathers 18 36 20 11 3 11 - 100 (5148) t-<
Mothers 17 36 16 14 6 12 - 100 (5148) '";,.
Children (all) 9 28 16 26 7 10 4 100 (5148) SChildren
'"Religious, from non·manual working 4 40 12 19 4 19 3 100 (2048) ;0
class background mtl1Religious. from manual class. background 7 46 4 15 4 21 4 100 (400) 1',;Religious, from farmers background 2 53 13 5 1 25 2 100 (148) ZNon-religious, from non·manual working 12 15 22 36 10 1 4 100 (2227) ()
class background m
Non-religious, from manual working 31 14 8 28 13 1 5 100 (286)
class background
Non-religious, from farmers background 3 18 39 31 8 - 3 100 (39)
~
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party. Furthermore, within the religious and non-religious groups there
were significant differences in political preferences between children with
a blue-collar and a white-collar working class background. Of the non-
religious children from a blue-collar background, 31% preferred the Labor
Party, while for non-religious children from a white-collar background
this is 12%. Although the importance of socioeconomic and religious
cleavages has decreased in the Netherlands during the last decades, these
findings illustrate that even among children they are still politically relevant
(Van der Eijk and Niemaller, 1992; Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf, 1995).
The relationship between political party preference of children and that
of their parents is shown in Table 2. The figures in the cells on the main
diagonal of this table give the political party preferences of children with
politically homogeneous parents. The results of 75% of the children are
found in these cells. The upper left cell shows that children whose parents
both prefer the PvdA have a 50% chance of preferring that party. It is
not exceptional that children have the same political preference as their
parents. The figures in the other cells on the main diagonal show that
children with homogeneous CDA parents have a 70% chance of having
the same political party preference as their parents, children of homo-
geneous VVD parents have a 70% chance, children of homogeneous D66-
parents have a 79% chance, children of homogeneous Green Left-parents
have a 71% chance, and children with small right parents have a 90%
chance. An average of 71 % of the children with politically homogeneous
parents have the same political preference as their parents.
The off-diagonal cells show the chance which a child with politically
heterogeneous parents has for a particular political party preference. For
these children, the chance of same political party preference as father or
mother is less than that for children with politically homogeneous parents.
For example, for the children whose fathers prefer the PvdA and whose
mothers prefer the CDA, 19% had the same party preference as their
father and 35% the same as their mother. For those children with polit-
ically heterogeneous parents, an average of 34% had the same political
preference as their father and 38% the same as their mother. The figures
in Table 2 show that children with politically heterogeneous parents have
about the same chance of not preferring a political party as children with
politically homogeneous parents, i.e. 4%.
MULTINOMINAL LOGISTIC DIAGONAL REFERENCE MODELS
Research on intergenerational transmission of political party preference
has been confronted with the problem of how the influence of fathers
and mothers can be placed in a model (Niemi et a!., 1982; Sorenson and
Brownfield, 1991). Using classical techniques such as an ANOVA-like
model, the problem of the high correlation between the father's and the
mother's party preference arises. In this study, for example, 75% of all
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TABLE 2
Percentages of Chlldren Who Prefer a Particular Party, Given Their Fathers' and Mothers'
Political Party Preference in the Netherlands in 1991 (N between Brackets)
Political party preference: Mother
Political party
preference: Father PvdA CDA VVD 066 Green left Small right
PvdA PvdA: 50 PvdA: 19 PvdA: 42 PvdA: 14 PvdA: 21 PvdA: 50
CDA: 5 CDA: 35 CDA: eDA: 4 eDA: 1 CDA:
VVD' 4 VVD: 6 VVD, 25 VVD: 7 VVD: VVD,
066: 28 D66: 28 D66' 17 066, 63 066, 28 066,
GL: 10 GL: 8 GL: 8 GL: 9 GL: 44 GL:
sr: 0 sr: sr: sr: ST: ST: 50
Dp: 3 op: 4 Dp: 8 Dp: 4 op: 6 op:
(649) (78) (12) (118) (89) (2)
CDA PvdA: 26 PvdA: 2 PvdA, PvdA: 2 PvdA: 10 PvdA:
CDA: 18 CDA: 70 CDA: 40 CDA 22 eDA: 29 CDA: 57
VVD: 7 VVD: 6 VVD: 35 VVD: 7 YVD: 3 VVD; 3
D66: 33 D66: 16 D66: 15 066: 59 066, 26 D66, 17
GL: 7 GL: 3 GL: 6 GL 8 GL: 29 GL: 3
ST: Sf: 0 Sf: Sf:
'"
sr: 10
op: 9 Dp: 4 Dp: 4 Dp: 3 op: 3 op: 10
(55) (1516) (102) (121) (31) (30)
VVD PvdA: 13 PvdA: 2 PvdA: 2 PvdA: PvdA: PvdA:
eDA: 10 CDA: 36 CDA: 7 CDA: 5 CDA: 11 CDA: 40
VVD: 23 VVD: 41 VVD: 70 VVD: 30 VVD: 11 VVD: 20
D66: 35 066, 16 D66, 14 066: 60 066, 53 066, 40
GL, 10 GL: 1 GL: 2 GL, 4 GL 21 GL:
ST: ST: st': sr: Sf: Sf:
np: 10 op: 4 np: 5 op: op: 5 np:
(40) (195) (651) (103) (19) (5)
D66 PvdA: 19 PvdA: 7 PvdA: PvdA: 1 PvdA: 6 PvdA:
CDA: 3 CDA: 28 CDA: 3 CDA: 6 CDA: 3 CDA:
VVD: 6 VVD: 5 VVD: 35 VVD: 5 VVD: 6 VVD: 50
066: 58 D66: 57 D66: 56 066: 79 D66, 57 D66: SO
GL: II GL: 2 GL 3 Gl: 6 GL: 29 GL:
sr: sr: Sf: ST: 0 sr: sr:
op: 4 np: 2 op: 3 np: 4 np: np:
(73) (61) (34) (381) (35) (2)
Green left P>;dk 10 PvdA: PvdA, PvdA: PvdA: 3 PvdA:
eDA: CDA: CDA: eDA: CDA: 2 eDA:
VVD: VVD; VVD; VVD: 6 VVD: 2 VVD:
066, 45 D66: 25 066: 50 D66: 44 066: 21 D66:
GL, 42 GL: 75 GL: 50 GL: 50 GL: 71 GL:
sr: sr; ST: ST: ST: Sf:
up: 3 np: np: Dr: np: 2 op:
(31) (4) (4) (16) (114) (0)
Small right PvdA: PvdA: PvdA: PvdA: PvdA: PvdA: 0
CDA: 100 CDA: 75 CDA: CDA: CDA: eDA: 6
VVD: VVD: VVO: 50 VVD: VVD: VVD: 1
D66' D66: D66, D66, 100 D66: D66: 1
GL: GL: 25 GL GL: GL GL 0
sr: ST:
'"
50 ST: Sf: ST: 90
op: np: "p: op: np: Dp: 1
(1) (4) (2) (1) (OJ (569)
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the children have parents with the same political party preference. Fur-
thermore, these models are troublesome when analyzing the impact of
heterogeneity effects per se. As Hope and Sobel stated, the main effects
of father's and mother's political preference in these models contain some
heterogeneity effects per se (Hope, 1971, 1975; Sobel, 1981).
In this study, we used multinominallogistic diagonal reference models.
As Sorenson and Brownfield argued, diagonal reference models are more
appropriate than classical techniques for the analysis of parental influence
(Sorenson and Brownfield, 1991). The diagonal reference models as orig-
inally designed by Sobel are equipped to deal only with ordinal dependent
variables (Sobel, 1981, 1985). In our study, we used a multinominallogistic
version of these models. This version is equipped to deal with dependent
variables with several nominal categories. Such an adaptation of the di-
agonal reference models is relevant because of the importance of treating
political party preference as a nominal variable. Because the Dutch po-
litical party system can be characterized as multiparty system with a strong
. socioeconomic as well as a significant religious dimension, political parties
cannot easily be placed on one dimension (Lijphart, 1975; Andeweg, 1982;
Middendorp, 1991). In addition, our study treats not having a political
preference as an important category of the dependent variable political
preference.
The mechanism of the mu!tinominal logistic diagonal reference models
is best explained using Table 2. The upper left cell shows that children
with politically homogeneous PvdA-parents have a 50/3 odds of preferring
the PvdA to having no political preference. This gives a log-odds of 2.81
(~ log(50/3)). The main diagonal cell, diagonally under it, shows that
children with politically homogeneous CDA parents have a log-odds of
- .69 (~ log(2/4)) of preferring the PvdA to haVing no political pref-
erence. Diagonal reference models assume that for children whose father
prefers the PvdA and whose mother prefers the CDA, the log-odds of
preferring the PvdA to having no political preference is a weighted mean
of the above-mentioned log-odds for children with politically homoge-
neous PvdA and homogeneous CDA parents. Assuming that the relative
influence of fathers and mothers is equal for all children, according to
the mechanism of the diagonal reference models, this log-odds can be
calculated as: (.5*2.81) + (.5* - .69) = 1.06.' Analogous calculations can
be made for other children with other combinations of heterogeneous
parents.
A general multinominal logistic diagonal reference ,model can be rep-
resented as
(1)
5 Note that the P-iip-parameters (of the main diagonal cells) and the weighting parameters
are estimated simultaneously (see also Sobel (1981) and Footnote 7).
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iip (R)/Lup + (1 - R)/Ljjp + BLp * covariateL • (2)
In these formulas, 7Tiip' is the probability that child k has party preference
p, given the father's political party preference i and the mother's political
party preference j. The term "Iiip stands for the log-odds that the same
child k prefers party preference p to other party preferences. The pa-
rameters /Lup and /Ljjp indicate for child k, with various types of politically
homogeneous parents, the log-odds of preferring party preference p to
other party preferences. The term R stands for the relative weight of the
father's political party preference, and (1 - R) for the relative weight
of the mother's political party preference. We include co-variates in the
models representing socioeconomic class and religion, where L stands for
the various co-variates and BLP for the accompanying parameters. For
each possible political party preference, p, with the exception of the
reference category, a BL parameter was estimated.' An important char-
acteristic of the diagonal reference models is that these models are par-
simonious in the use of parameters. For example, only a single parameter
is needed to model the relative influence of the father's and mother's
political party preference.
TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
Mode! Selection
To test the hypotheses, we fitted several diagonal reference models,
each representing a single hypothesis or a combination of hypotheses.'
t> The diagonal reference models have previously been applied in studying the effects of
intergenerational social mobility (Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf. 1993; Weakliem, 1993) and
partner's class position (De Graaf and Heath, 1992) on political preference. For morc
detailed information on the diagonal reference models, we refer the reader to Sobel
(1981,1985) and Hendrickx, De Graaf, Lammers, and Ultee (1994).
7 The estimation of the parameters of multinominallogistic diagonal reference models is
straightforward (see Agresti, 1990, pp. 40-41, 316). We presume the political parties to be
distinct and weighted independently, especially after conditioning on the explanatory vari-
ables (see McFadden, 1974). Consequently. given the observed data {np , pl. ... , P},
and assuming multinominal sampling, the log likelihood function is
(3)
To eliminate redundancies in the parameters. we treat L as a function of the P-l probabilities
obtained by dropping 'fp• since 1Tp = 1 - (trl + ... + 1Tp-tl. A general multinominal
logistic probability model can be given as
Ttjipk = exp('11ijp)/I exp("li/p)
For diagonal reference models the 71'jp in this formula can be expressed as
T}ijp = (R).uiiP + (1 - R)J1-Jip + Bt.p * covariate,-
(1)
(2)
Since maximizing the log-likelihood is equivalent to minimizing ~he negative of the log-
likelihood, we use the loss function in the CNLR procedure of SPSS-X to estimate the
parameters of the specified models. Readers interested in more information on how ro fit
these models should write to the authors.
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To select the model that represented our data best, we compare the fit
of one model with a less general one nested within that model. To detect
whether the fits of models differ significantly, we use two measures: the
traditional Likelihood-ratio test and the BIC (Bayesian Information Coef-
ficient)8 Comparing both measures, the Likelihood-ratio test has the dis-
advantage that, when analyzing a large number of cases, differences be-
tween models easily tum out to be significant (Raferty, 1986). The !:lIC
takes into account the number of cases in the analysis and is thus better
equipped to make a selection between two models. A second advantage
of this BIC is that it shows whether a model describes the data reasonably,
i.e. if the BIC takes a negative value. When several models are compared,
the model with the most negative BIC is the one to be preferred. The
fit statistics of all the models are presented in Table 3.
Model A represents the equal-parental socialization hypothesis where
the relative'influence of fathers' and mothers' political party preferences
are construed to be equal for all children. On the basis of the negative
BIe we conclude that this model gives a reasonable presentation of the
data. To test whether the equal-parental socialization hypothesis is to be
rejected, we tested the other hypotheses.
The mother-dominated socialization hypothesis is reflected in Model B.
This hypothesis assumes that the mother's political party preference has
more influence on the political party preference of a child than the father's.
To test our mother-dominated socialization hypothesis, we allow the rel-
ative influence of the father's and mother's political party preference to
differ by adding a parameter (M) to the relative weights in Model A.
Table 3 shows that, according to both the Likelihood-ratio test and the
BIC, Model B does not result in a significant improvement in fit as
compared to Model A. Consequently, the mother-dominated socialization
hypothesis is to be rejected.
. There are two gender-specific socialization hypotheses. The first states
that a mother's political party preference has more influence on the po-
litical party preference of a daughter than a father's. The second states
that a father's political party preference has more influence on the political
party preference of a son than a mother's. Models C and D reflect these
hypotheses for girls and boys separately while Model E reflects these
hypotheses simultaneously. In these models we introduce an interaction
between.the weight parameter and the dummy variables girl and boy.
This implies that the relative weight of father's and mother's political
party preference is allowed to differ between boys and girls. If both our
gender-specific socialization hypotheses are valid, the accompanying pa-
rameters (0,;'1 and 0bo,) should be larger than zero. As the figures in Table
3 indicate, according to the Likelihood ratio test Models C, D, and E all
/I The formula to calculate the BIC is HIC = L2 - ndf * log(N).
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TABLE 3
Multinomial Logistic Diagonal Reference Models fOf the Relative Effects of Fathers' and
Mothers' Political Party Preference on Those of Their Children (N = 5148)
10631.98 A-C 8.34*'" -32792.1
10630.20 A-D 10.12** -32793.9
10622.38 A-E 17.94** -32793.1
C-E 9.60**
D-E 7.82**
10636.40 A-F 3.92* -32787.7
10636.40 A-G 3.92* -32787.7
Model* df""'d
A: Equal-parental sociaJization~hypothesjs 66
B: Mother-dominated socialization- 67
hypothesis
C: Gender-specific sociaHzation-hypothesis 67
for girls
D: Gender-specific socialization-hypothesis 67
for boys
E: Gender-specific socialization-hypotheses 68
for girls and boys
F: Heterogeneity-hypothesis 67
G: Magnitude of heterogeneity-hypothesis 67
U AI.
10640.32
10640.28 A-B .04
mc
-32792.3
-32783.8
Note. The models were specified as "follows:
1Tijpk = exp(l1,)p)/~ exp(71.jp} (1)
Model:
A: 1);jp = (.5)piip + (.5)J.Liip + B Lp * covariateL (2)
B: 1'}iip = (.5 - M),u'ip + (.5 + M}JLJ)p + BLp '" covariateL (2)
C: 'l'}'jp = (.5 - O~r1 :;. girl)JLi',. + (.5 + Oglrl '* girl)fLiJp + BI.,. * covariate!. (2)
D: l];jp = (.5 + O"",y '" bOY)fL,;p + (.5 - 8l>oy * boy)j'.tiiP + B t .;> '" covariateL (2)
E: 7j;jp = (.5 - ojli<l '" girl + 000)" '" bOy),uiip + (.5 + 011;>1 * girl - Oho,,, * bOY)J.Ljip (2)
+ Bt.p '" covariateL
F: TJijp = (.5)II-'i1' + (.5)/l-'iP + H * heterogeneity + BLp '" covariateL (2)
G: l};ir = (.5)""';ip + (.5)JLiil' + H * magnitude of heterogeneity + B1{, '" covariatet (2)
'" Significant at the .05 leveL
*'" Significant at the .01 level.
resulted in a significantly better fit than Model A. Model E resulled in
an significantly better fit than Models C and D. The BIC of Models C.
D, and E differ only slighlly. There is, therefore, no reason for other
conclusions. The estimated parameters OboY and 0girJ have, as expected. a
posilive value. These resulls corroborate the two gender-specific sociali-
zatiou hypotheses.
Both our heterogeneity hypotheses assume an independent effect of
politically heterogeneous parents on the political party preference of their
children. The heterogeneity hypothesis holds that children with polilically
heterogeneous parents are less apt to have a political preference than
children with politically homogeneous parents. To test this hypothesis,
we modified Model F by adding a dummy variable heterogeneiJy as covar,
iate 10 Model A. According to the hypothesis, we should expect the
accompanying parameter H to be smaller than zero. Table 3 shows that
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Model F, according to the Likelihood-ratio test, results in a marginally
better fit than Model A. The BIC of Model F, however, is notably less
negative than that of Model A. Furthennore, the estimated heterogeneity
parameter H is, contrary to our expectations, larger than zero. Thus, this
heterogeneity hypothesis has to be rejected.
According to the magnitude of heterogeneity hypothesis, the larger the
magnitude of cross-pressures in a situation with heterogeneous parents,
the more the chance that children will not show a political party pref-
erence. To test this hypothesis, model G was developed. Model G is
largely the same as Model F, except that the variable amount of heter-
ogeneity replaces the variable heterogeneity. The fit of Model G, according
to both the Likelihood ratio test and the BlC, is coincidentally the same
as that of Model F. This implies that the magnitude of heterogeneity
hypothesis also has to be rejected.'
Interpretation of the Parameters of the Best Model
The model selection indicates that Model E, representing the gender-
specific socialization hypothesis for both boys and girls, gives the best
data representation.
The upper part of Table 4 shows the estimated parameters of the relative
weights of father's and mother's political party preference on the political
party preference of their child, i.e. ligi" and 800,. The values imply that
the relative influence of the father's and mother's political party preference
on that of their child is gender-specific. The relative effect of father's
political party preference on that of a son (.50 + .07 = .57) is greater
than mother's (.50 - .07 = .43), but mother's political party preference
has more effect on the party preference of a daughter (.50 + .06 = .56)
than father's (.50 - .06 = ,44).
The estimated J.l-iipparameters of the model are presented in the middle
pan of Table 4. These parameters give the log-<>dds of preferring a specific
political party to not preferring a specific political party for a non-religious
child from a blue-collar background (the reference category) with polit-
ically homogeneous parents. From these estimated J.I-;;p,parameters, we
calculated the chance for preference for each political party for children
with politically homogeneous parents. Chances are noted between brack-
ets. The figures show that children with politically homogeneous parents
have a high chance of having the same political preference as their parents.
Using both the parameters from the upper and middle part of Table
4, the log-odds that children with politically heterogeneous parents will
prefer a specific political party compared to not preferring a political party
" Both heterogeneity hypotheses have been also tested using models in which the de-
pendent variable was dichotol1lised into no political party preference versus any political
party preference. These tests, again, resulted in a rejection of both heterogeneity hypotheses.
TABLE 4
Parameter Estimates of Multinomial Logistic Diagonal Reference Model E, Representing the Gender·Specific Socialization Hypotheses
for Girls and Boys
Gender-specific interaction effect
for girls (Bprl).06 for boys (B!lQy) In
Log-odds of preferring .a specific political party to no preference (probability' to prefer a "articular political party):
No preference
PvdA CDA VVD D66 Green left Smal1 right (ref.)
Politically homogeneous parents
PvdA JiPrdA.,l'>'<lA,P 2.83 (60%) -,32 (3%) -.59 (2%) 1.72 (20%) 1.15 (11%) -4.38 (0%) 0 (4%)
CDA JLcpA,CDA.p -.71 (4%) 1.88 (53%) -.20 (7%) .97 (21%) -.18 (7%) -5.78 (0%) 0 (8%)
VVD I-lvvo,VVD,p" -,78 (3%) -.06 (6%) 2.26 (64%) .90 (16%) -.72 (3%) -8.17 (0%) 0 (7%)
D66 J.'.066.D66,p -.14 (3%) -.21 (3%) .00 (4%) 3.09 (78%) .91 (9%) -4.31 (0%) 0 (4%)
Green left J.lcL,uL,p .71 (3%) -1.12 (0%) -1.76 (0%) 2.07 (13%) 3.95 (82%) -12.55 (0%) 0 (2%)
Small right lL.r,sr,p -1.43 (2%) .36 (14%) -1.41 (2%) -.81 (4%) -1.22 (3%) 1.90 (65%) 0 (lO%)
Covariates
Religious, from non-manual p" - .10 1.32 .85 .56 -.03 2.47
working class background
Religious, from manual p" -.26 1.10 -,10 .19 -.10 2.40
working class background
Religious, from farmers P" .49 1.73 1.21 -.04 -.79 3.62
background
Non-religious. from non*man~ f34p - .18 .44 .63 .36 -.12 .63
ual working class
background
Non-religious. from manual
-
0 0 0 0 0 0
working class background
("f.)
Non-religious. from farme~ p" -.86 .87 1.63 1.21 .58 -1.90
background
;
~
~
~
!
~
....
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can be calculated. Because the model selection indicated that intergen-
erational political socialization is gender-specific, we make a distinction
between boys and girls. For example, the log-odds that a non-religious
boy from a blue-collar background with a father who prefers the Labor
Party (PvdA) and a mother who prefers the Christian Democratic Appeal
(CDA) will prefer the PvdA to not preferring a political party is 1.31 (=
(.50 + m) * 2.83 + (.50 - .07) * - .71). For girls in the same situation
the log-odds is .85. There is a 28% chance that boys will prefer the PvdA.
For girls the chance is 23%.
The lower part of Table 4 gives the effect of socioeconomic class and
religion. As mentioned above, non-religious children from a blue-collar
background serve as the reference category. The values indicate the dif-
ference in the log-odds between a child who prefers a specific party to
not preferring any party, in the reference category, and a child with the
same preference who belongs to a different social class. For example, the
log-odds that a religious boy with a manual working class background will
prefer the PvdA rather than no political party is 1.05 (= 1.31 - .26),
for the same category girl, .59( = .85 - .26). Using similar computations,
the log-odds that a specific party is preferred rather than no party can be
calculated.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The main purpose of this study has been to examine the intergenera-
tional transmission of political party preference. Hypotheses were for-
mulated using earlier political socialization studies concerning the influ-
ence of a father's and a mother's political party preference on that of
their child. These hypotheses were tested by analyzing data from a survey
held among high school students in The Netherlands in 1991.
The mother-dominated socialization hypothesis states that a mother's
political party preference has more influence on the political party pref-
erence of the child than father's. However, the outcomes of our empirical
analysis imply that, in general, the relative influence of the father's and
mother's political party preference did not differ. The results of our anal-
ysis confirm the gender-specific socialization hypotheses. The analysis
shows that mother's political party preference has more impact on daugh-
ter's political party preference than does father's. Father's political party
preference has more impact on son's political party preference than moth-
er's. This has major theoretical implications. It implies that the traditional
idea of the father's political role as being dominant has to be rejected.
In addition, the idea that the mother is the dominant political socialization
agent because she spends more time with her children has to be revised.
This implies that simple theories about the roles that fathers and mothers
play in the political socialization of their children will not suffice. Future
research should focus on the specific roles of fathers and mothers. It
could, for example, be useful to examine whether sons and daughters
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discuss or argue politics more frequently with their father or with their
mother. Additionally, it is worthwhile to investigate whether gender-spe-
cific socialization processes occur with respect to political orientations
other than party preference.
. The heterogeneity hypothesis has to he rejected. This hypothesis states
that children with politically heterogeneous parents are less likely to have
a political party preference than children with politically homogeneous
parents. The result contradicts the cross-pressure theory suggested by
Lazarsfeld et al. (1948): Voters exposed to a cross-pressure situation are
confused and consequently have less of a chance of having a political
party preference than voters who are not exposed to a cross-pressure
situation. An explanation for our findings may be that children with het-
erogeneous parents do not feel they are in a cross-pressure situation. It
is possible that parents do not pressure their children into having the
same political preference.
The findings of this study show a fairly strong parental political so-
cialization in the Netherlands. Politically homogeneous parents are es-
pecially successful in transmitting their political preference to their chil-
dren. This seems to contradict earlier findings which show that in the
Netherlands a fairly low rate of intergenerational transmission of party
preference exists. An explanation for these earlier findings might be the
high percentage of politically heterogeneous parents in The Netherlands
due to the existence of many political parties. These heterogeneous parents
are apparently relatively less successful in transmitting their party pref-
erence. As a result, intergenerational transmission of political party pref-
erence in the Netherlands seems less than in other countries. In future
international comparisons, it is advisable to focus separately on the trans-
mission of party preferences to children with politically homogeneous
parents and to children with politically heterogeneous parents.
Due to the limitations of our data, we have had to assume that the
parent's political party preference as perceived by their children was the
same as the parent's actual political party preference. Furthermore, we
were unable to analyze mutual influences of fathers and mothers and of
children and their parents. Future political socialization research should
focus on large scale surveys in which not only the children but the parents
as well are followed separately over a longer period of time. If these
surveys are held in different countries, it would be possible not only to
describe cross-national differences in political socialization processes but
also to test for possible explanations for these differences.
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